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Appeal from Order of Dismissal of March 14, 1995 in favor of 
Appellees, and of Order of March 9, 1995, and Order to Vacate 
Judgment of February 8, 1995, before the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup Presiding 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4)• This case was 
assigned from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on August 1, 1995. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
In addition to the relevant case law cited hereinafter, the 
Defendants and Appellees in the above-entitled case believe the 
following authority to be determinative of this dispute on appeal: 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32 
Utah Code Annotated §68-3-2 (1953) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a 
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and in setting aside a judgment, order or 
proceeding based upon excusable neglect, after taking into 
consideration all of the facts in a case. The trial court's 
determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion. Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). Furthermore, a trial 
court has broad discretion to set aside a stipulation on a 
procedural matter. United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 445 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1968). 
2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether counsel for the Defendants and Appellees 
could bind the same with respect to the September 21, 1994 
stipulation, when the stipulation involved a settlement of the 
entire case and did not involve merely a procedural matter, and 
when the trial court later found excusable neglect on the part of 
the Defendants and Appellees with respect to said stipulation. 
2. Whether Judge Rigtrup of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, acted 
within his discretion in ruling in accordance with Rule 60, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in enforcing the material terms to 
the stipulation of September 21, 1994. 
3. Whether the Plaintiff and Appellant is barred from 
raising certain issues on appeal which were not raised at the 
trial court level. In particular, whether the Plaintiff and 
Appellant is barred from raising the issue of the propriety of 
Judge Hyde's referral of this case back to Judge Rigtrup, when 
this issue was neither raised below, nor did the Plaintiff and 
Appellant object to the substance of Judge Hyde's ruling below. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The relevant procedural facts in this case are as follows. 
The parties to this action entered into a stipulation in open 
court on September 21, 1994 in an effort to resolve the underlying 
contractual dispute herein [R 601, R 602, R 614]. Due to the 
illness of Judge Moffat, the Judge originally assigned to this 
case, Judge Rigtrup presided over the entry of this stipulation 
onto the Court record [R 614]. Time was not made of the essence 
for purposes of said stipulation, but instead an arbitrary and 
tentative deadline of October 3, 1994, was selected [R 601, R 602, 
R 614]. The corporate Defendant was not able to receive approval 
of the board of directors of the settlement agreement amount of 
$7,500.00 by the arbitrary deadline date, and the Plaintiff and 
Appellant moved to reinstate a Summary Judgment which had been 
previously vacated by stipulation of the parties [R 586, R 605, R 
628, R 657]. 
Due to the continued illness of Judge Moffat, Judge Hyde was 
assigned to hear the matter, and he ruled without oral argument, 
on November 18, 1994, to reinstate the Summary Judgment in the 
amount of $38,842.74 [R 667]. The Defendants and Appellees 
submitted a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from the Summary 
Judgment, based upon excusable neglect [R 708]. Judge Hyde, on 
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February 8, 1995 [R 786] vacated his prior order reinstating the 
Summary Judgment, and ordered that Judge Rigtrup, who had been 
presiding during the time that the in-court stipulation was 
entered into on September 21, 1994, was the proper Judge to hear 
the issues incident to the Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion, and the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of the Summary Judgment [R 
786], 
On February 27, 1995, Judge Rigtrup ruled that the Summary 
Judgment was not to be reinstated, but instead that the material 
terms to the stipulation of September 21, 1994, were to be 
enforced [R 828, R 832]. The case was then assigned to Judge 
Peuler [R 856]. The Plaintiff and Appellant filed its notice of 
appeal on March 17, 1995 [R 845] and its Amended Notice of Appeal 
on April 3, 1995 [R 850]. The procedural history of this case is 
outlined in greater detail within the Defendants' and Appellees' 
Statement of Facts, set forth hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On or about September 21, 1994, before the 
Honorable Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, the attorneys for the parties in 
this case entered into a voluntary stipulation and settlement 
agreement, purportedly resolving the dispute between the parties 
[see copy of transcript attached hereto as Exhibit "A", on page 2 
5 
at line 15; R 601, R 602, R 614]. 
2. Pursuant to the terms of the stipulation, and in 
accordance with the understanding of the Defendants' counsel at 
that time, the Defendants were to pay $7,500.00 [ R 601, R 602, R 
614]. The stipulation and order were first to have been prepared 
by Mr. Rust, counsel for the Plaintiff, and the Defendants were 
first to have had the opportunity to sign the stipulation and 
approve the order as to form, pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration [see Exhibit "A" and see Affidavits 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"; R 601, R 602, R 614]. 
3. The settlement deadline date was tentatively 
scheduled for approximately ten (10) days after September 21, 
1994, or October 4, 1994, contingent upon the appropriate approval 
of the corporate Defendant and the signing of an order by this 
Court [see Exhibit MB"; R 614, R 628, R 657]. 
4. Mr. Rust, counsel for the Plaintiff, assented to 
this arrangement by stating, "I think we have an agreement here" 
[see Exhibit "A"f on page 2 at line 19; R 615]. 
5. Counsel for the Defendants, Mr. Zoll, communicated 
6 
with Defendant Floyd Weston over the telephone regarding this 
conditional stipulation and Mr. Westonf who was not clearly 
understood by Mr. Zoll, stated that prior to entering into the 
settlement agreement he would need to get the approval of the 
Board of Directors of the corporate Defendant [see Exhibit "B"; R 
623, R 628, R 657]. 
6. Mr. Zoll described the material terms to the 
agreement to Mr. Weston at that time [see Exhibit "B"]. However, 
Weston misunderstood Zoll relative to the conditional October 3, 
1994 deadline, and believed that the stipulation would not be 
binding until an order had been signed by the Judge, pursuant to 
his prior experience in such matters, until he had received a copy 
of the proposed order and until the approval of the Board of 
Directors of the corporate Defendant, in entering into the 
agreement, had been received [see Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R 
657]. 
7. The conditional agreement was never reduced to a 
written stipulation, and an order embodying said agreement was 
never signed by the Court, in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 4-504(3), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
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8. Inasmuch as the members of the Board of Directors 
of the corporate Defendant were out of town at all relevant times, 
Floyd Weston was unable to get their approval for the settlement 
agreement. As a resultf the $7f500.00 amount was not paid to the 
Plaintiff by October 3, 1994 [see Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R 
657]. 
9. Mr. Weston personally contacted the agents for the 
Plaintiff on October 4, 1994, and informed them that the Board had 
not yet approved the agreement, but that the Defendants were 
otherwise still readyf willing and able to pay the settlement 
amount. The Plaintiff, by and through its agents, refused to 
accept the amount, claiming that the arbitrary and conditional 
deadline of October 3, 1994 had not been met by the Defendants 
[see Exhibit "B"; R 623f R 628, R 657]. 
10. In addition, on October 4, 1994, Mr. Zoll had a 
telephone conversation with Mr. Rust, wherein Zoll explained that 
the Defendant Formula Technology, Inc., required approval of its 
Board of Directors. Mr. Zoll further explained to Rust that 
Weston had misunderstood the outcome of the settlement conference, 
and was unaware of the October 3, 1994 deadline [see Exhibit "B"; 
R 623, R 628, R 657]. 
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11. During the course of that conversation, no mention 
was made relative to a reinstatement of the Summary Judgment, or 
to any other form of default proceedings. Mr. Zoll then stated 
that the Defendants would still pay the $7,500.00 to settle the 
matter by October 10, 1994. However, Mr. Rust refused to accept 
the arrangement [See Exhibit "B"; R 623, R 628, R 657]. 
12. Time was not made of the essence in the terms of 
the stipulation, but the October 3, 1994 deadline was tentatively 
designated as the end of the ten (10) day period after the 
settlement agreement was allegedly entered into [see Exhibit "A"; 
R 614]. Inasmuch as October 1, 1994 was a Saturday, counsel and 
the Court designated October 3, 1994 as the conditional deadline 
date. Therefore, that date had no independent significance as a 
deadline for the payment of the $7,500.00 settlement amount [See 
Exhibit "A"; R 614]. 
13. The Plaintiff now unilaterally seeks to reinstate a 
Summary Judgment against the Defendants, in the amount of 
$38,842.74, which was previously vacated, pursuant to a voluntary 
Stipulation between counsel on August 5, 1994 [R 586]. 
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14. On or about November 4, 1994, the Third Judicial 
District Court was scheduled to hear the Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reinstate the Summary Judgment, which hearing was continued until 
November 18, 1994, due to the fact that the Judge assigned to hear 
this matter did not yet have the Court's file [R 666]. 
15. However, on November 18, 1994, this Court, the 
Honorable Judge Hyde presiding, made a ruling, granting the 
Plaintiff's Motion without ever affording the Defendants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the dispositive Motion, in spite of 
the Defendants' timely request for oral argument, made in 
accordance with Rule 4-501(3)(b), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration [R 667]. 
16. The Defendants then filed a Motion for Relief from 
the Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure [R 704]. 
17. On or about February 2, 1995, Judge Hyde ruled to 
vacate his ruling of November 18, 1994, and ruled that Judge 
Rigtrup would be the proper judge to review the Defendants' 60(b) 
Motion, and to rule with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reinstatement of Summary Judgment, due to the fact that Rigtrup 
10 
was the presiding Judge at the time of the September 21, 1994 
stipulation [see transcript of hearing before Judge Hyde, attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C"; R 775, R 865 - R 904]. In addition, on or 
about February 8, 1995, Judge Hyde signed an Order vacating the 
Summary Judgment, in order that Judge Rigtrup could make a 
decision relative to these matters [R 786]. 
18. On or about February 27, 1995, this matter came 
before Judge Rigtrup for oral argument [see transcript of hearing 
before Judge Rigtrup, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"; R 828]. The 
Court, after having the opportunity to review the procedural 
history of the case and the underlying merits of the respective 
parties' claims, ruled to enforce the material terms to the 
stipulation entered into on September 21, 1994, and the Plaintiff 
subsequently appealed [R 828, R 845, R 850]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff and Appellant has claimed that counsel for the 
Defendants and Appellees, B Ray Zoll, Esq., irreversibly bound his 
clients when he entered into the stipulation at issue, on the 
record, on September 21, 1994. The Plaintiff and Appellant thus 
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
enforce said stipulation, the terms for which included the October 
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3, 1994 arbitrary deadline date, and in failing to reinstate the 
Summary Judgment. However, Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32, and the 
relevant case law interpreting this statute, provides that while 
an attorney binds his client with respect to procedural matters, 
the power to settle a lawsuit clearly resides in the client. 
The Defendants and Appellees were not present in the court 
room at the time the stipulation was entered into by their 
attorney, and there was clearly a mistake of fact and an 
inadvertence with respect to receiving approval of the board of 
directors of the corporate Defendant for purposes of paying the 
settlement amount determined by the September 21, 1994 
stipulation. The trial court properly found excusable neglect on 
the part of the Defendants and Appellees in this regard, as argued 
more fully hereinafter. Therefore, in the interests of justice 
and due to this inadvertence on the part of the Defendants and 
Appellees, the trial court Judge properly refused to enforce in 
its entirety the stipulation of September 21, 1994. This decision 
was squarely within the broad discretion of the trial court to set 
aside settlement stipulations, under such circumstances. 
In addition, the Plaintiff and Appellant, at this point in 
the proceedings, takes issue with Judge Hyde's referral of the 
case back to Judge Rigtrup for purposes of a determination with 
respect to the Defendant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
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Judgment, and with respect to the Plaintiff's Motion to Reinstate 
Summary Judgment, as a violation of the "law of the case" 
doctrine. However, it has been clearly held by the Utah appellate 
courts that a decision may be set aside in order to correct a 
mistake, and this does not amount to a violation of said doctrine. 
In any event, the Plaintiff failed entirely to make objection 
before the Third Judicial District Court with respect to Judge 
Hyde's Order referring the matter back to Judge Rigtrup, beyond a 
mere objection to the form of said Order. Therefore, this issue 
was not raised before the trial court and cannot properly be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Third Judicial District Court has acted at all relevant 
times within its broad discretion in this case, and the rulings 
made and relevant orders entered thereby, which the Plaintiff and 
Appellant has appealed, should properly be affirmed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Although this case has a complicated procedural 
history, involving several different judges, this is not the fault 
of the Defendants and Appellees, or of the Third Judicial District 
Court, and this factor has not impacted the propriety of the 
Court's ultimate decisions in this case, pursuant to the Court's 
broad discretion. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
I. LIMITATIONS UPON AN ATTORNEY'S ABILITY TO BIND A CLIENT 
The Plaintiff and Appellee has argued within its Appellate 
Brief that general principles of contract law are applicable in 
this case, in conjunction with an agent's ability to bind its 
principal. The Plaintiff and Appellee claims that B. Ray Zoll, as 
attorney of record for the Defendants and Appellees, acted as an 
ordinary agent, and bound the Defendants and Appellees in the same 
way, and to the same degree with respect to the settlement 
stipulation of September 21, 1994. However, Utah Code Annotated 
§78-51-32 (1953) more specifically delineates and describes the 
limitations to the attorney-client relationship, as follows: 
78-51-32. Authority of attorneys and counselors. 
An attorney and counselor has authority: 
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other 
written instrument necessary and proper for the 
prosecution of an action or proceeding about to be 
or already commenced, or for the prosection or 
defense of any right growing out of an action, 
proceeding or final judgment rendered therein. 
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action 
or proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk 
or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not 
otherwise. 
(3) to receive money claimed by his client in an action 
or proceeding during the pendency thereof or after 
judgment, unless a revocation of his authority is 
filed, and, upon payment thereof and not otherwise, 
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to discharge the claim or acknowledge satisfaction 
of the judgment. 
Subsections (2) and (3) of the above statute were discussed and 
interpreted by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of John Deere 
Co. v. A&H Equipment, 876 P.2d 880 (Ut. App. 1994), citing State 
v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
It was held in John Deere Co., that in Musselman, the only 
other Utah case to cite this statute at that timef the Court 
"noted the long-established rule that attorneys can make 
procedural decisions in a lawsuit but it is the client's right to 
make decisions regarding settlement." The Utah Court of Appeals 
in John Deere Co. further held that: 
We believe, however, that the thrust of §78-51-32(2) is 
to give attorneys the power to act on their client's behalf, 
in most cases without prior consultation, as to those 
procedural matters of a lawsuit for which attorneys have 
the expertise and obligation to act in the best interests of 
their clients. Section 78-51-32(2) protects an attorney from 
disciplinary action for so acting. . . Clearly, the power 
to settle a lawsuit resides in the client [emphasis 
added]. 
Therefore, although in general terms an attorney acts as an agent 
for his client, the above statute describes, defines and limits 
that particular agency relationship, to be distinguished from a 
customary principal-agent relationship pursuant to the common law 
of agency. 
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Utah Code Annotated §68-3-2 (1953) provides in relevant part 
that when a statute of the State of Utah and the general common 
law come in conflict, 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application 
to the statutes of this state . . . The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they 
relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them 
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the 
objects of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Pursuant to the language of the above statute, it is clear that 
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32 takes precedence over the general 
common law with respect to the nature and limitations of an 
attorney's agency relationship with his or her client. 
Accordingly, the Defendants and Appellees were not irreversibly 
bound by the acts of B. Ray Zoll, Esq., for purposes of the 
settlement stipulation of September 21, 1994. 
Therefore, Judge Rigtrup did not abuse his discretion in 
ruling that the Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the 
October 3, 1994 arbitrary deadline of the September 21, 1994 
stipulation. The stipulation was not reduced to writing pursuant 
to the requirements of Rule 4-504(3), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, and there was a miscommunication between counsel 
and the Defendant Floyd Weston, which the Court found to amount to 
excusable neglect on the part of the Defendants and Appellees. 
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Due to this inadvertence, and based upon Utah Code Annotated §78-
51-32, regarding the limitations of an attorney's ability to bind 
his or her client, Judge Rigtrup properly refused to enforce in 
its entirety the stipulation of September 21, 1994. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ACTED WITHIN ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
SETTING ASIDE THE REINSTATED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND IN 
ENFORCING THE MATERIAL TERMS OF THE STIPULATION 
In the case of United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 445 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1968), it was held that it is within the discretion 
of the trial court to determine whether settlement stipulations 
should be vacated orf alternatively, whether they should be 
enforced. In addition, the case of First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C.N. Zundel and Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), 
it was held by the Utah Supreme Court that parties are bound by 
their stipulations unless upon motion they are relieved therefrom 
by the court, "which may, in the interest of justice and fair 
play, set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable 
cause [emphasis added]. Also see Robbins v. Cook, 734 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1986) [The court has broad discretion to set aside a 
stipulation on a procedural matter. Upon timely motion, the court 
may set aside a stipulation for inadvertence or justifiable cause 
when it is in the interest of justice to do so]. 
Such is clearly the case heref and Judge Rigtrup's ruling was 
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well within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the 
furtherance of justice. Judge Rigtrup found that there was 
inadvertence and excusable neglect on the part of Defendant Floyd 
Weston [R 828, R 830] with respect to the October 3, 1994 deadline 
and thus, pursuant to the case law cited above, held that the 
Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the deadline date of 
the September 21, 1994 stipulation. 
The Appellant is attempting to turn a $7,500.00 settlement 
amount into a $38,842.74 judgment, without providing the Appellees 
the opportunity to present their case on the merits at trial, at 
which trial the Appellees have felt confident all along that they 
would prevail. The Appellant has conceded that this case has a 
confused procedural history. The clarification and resolution of 
this dispute has been months in coming, due to the fluctuations in 
judges to whom the case has been assigned, through no fault of any 
of the parties to this action. Furthermore, the Appellant has not 
disputed the lower court's finding of excusable neglect on the 
part of the Appellee Floyd Weston [R 828, R 830]. This is true in 
spite of the Appellant's erroneous implication that this neglect 
was in fact due to the actions of the Appellees' counsel, who it 
has been alleged irreversibly bound the Defendants and Appellees. 
As set forth within the Affidavit of Floyd Weston [see Exhibit 
"B"; R 628], the board of directors of the corporate appellee were 
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out of town and otherwise unavailable to approve the settlement 
agreement, which fact was not known to Weston at the time of the 
September 21, 1994 stipulation, and which fact was not properly 
communicated between the Appellees and their counsel [see Exhibit 
"B"; R 628]. 
Although the actions of an attorney will under ordinary 
circumstances serve to bind his or her client with respect to 
procedural matters, as set forth above, a trial court has broad 
discretion with respect to stipulations and pursuant to Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside a judgment, 
order or proceeding based upon excusable neglect, after taking 
into consideration all of the factors in a case. Birch v. Birch, 
111 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) [The trial court is afforded 
broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Subdivision (b), and its determination will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion]. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 
(Utah 1984) [The trial court has discretion in determining whether 
a movant has shown "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect," and the Supreme Court will reverse the trial court's 
ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion]. 
The Plaintiff and Appellant has not once, throughout these 
proceedings, provided evidence or even asserted that time was of 
the essence when the settlement agreement of September 21, 1994 
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was verbally entered into before Judge Rigtrup, and has never even 
claimed that this deadline date was a material term to the 
stipulation. The Appellant furthermore has not provided any 
claims or evidence of prejudice suffered due to the passing of 
this arbitrary October 3, 1994 deadline. This is especially true, 
in light of the fact that the Appellees tendered the payment 
amount only a few days after this "deadline," which payment was 
inexplicably refused by the Appellant. The Appellant is merely 
seeking a windfall based upon a technicality, and has at this 
point determined that it is no longer satisfied with the 
settlement amount of $7,500.00 which it previously and voluntarily 
agreed to in open court. 
But for the unavoidable inadvertence, the resulting excusable 
neglect of the Appellees, and the confounded judicial proceedings 
of the case, the settlement amount would have been paid by the 
arbitrarily chosen deadline date, and this entire case would have 
been resolved in October of 1994. Besides the fact that the 
Appellees claim the terms to the stipulation were ambiguous, said 
stipulation was entered into based upon an inadvertence and 
mistake of fact as set forth above, and there were outside factors 
giving rise to the Appellees' excusable neglect in this regard. 
Judge Rigtrup took all of these factors into account, and 
given the confused procedural history of this case, the Court 
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merely added the appropriate amount of accrued interest, costs, 
and $1,500.00 in attorney's fees to the original settlement amount 
of $7,500.00. This decision amounted to a fair and logical 
resolution of this matter. The lower Court had the broad 
discretion to rule as it did, and the Appellant has provided 
neither evidence of an abuse of this discretion, nor any 
compelling reasons why this determination should be disturbed on 
appeal, merely adding to the fees and costs to the parties. 
III. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE BELOW THE ISSUE OF THE 
PROPRIETY OF JUDGE HYDE'S RULING OF FEBRUARY 2, 1995, 
AND HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO DO SO ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff and Appellant has argued, within its Appellate 
Brief, that Judge Hyde improperly referred this case back to Judge 
Rigtrup for a determination on the Defendants' and Appellees' 
Motion for Relief from Judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and on the Plaintiff's and Appellant's 
Motion to Reinstate Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff and Appellant 
further claims that the ruling of Judge Hyde of December 2, 1994 
[R 675], reinstating the Summary Judgment, became "the law of the 
case", after which time the Defendants and Appellees filed their 
Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from this Judgment. However, Rule 
60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a clear and obvious 
means for vacating judgments, and the filing of a motion pursuant 
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to this Rule does not amount to a violation of the "law of the 
case doctrine." 
In any event, it has been held that "the law of the case 
doctrine does not prohibit a judge from catching a mistake and 
fixing it," Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993). It was 
further held in Gillmor that: 
Among situations where reconsideration ot a previously 
decided issue is recognized as desirable, notwithstanding 
the law of the case, is when there is a "need to correct 
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." [citing 
Federal Practice, §4478, at 790; emphasis added]. 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals held in McKee v. Williams, 741 
P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), that the trial court can 
change a ruling until a final decision is formally rendered, and 
that the trial court judge in McKee did not abuse his discretion 
by rescinding his prior decision. 
In any event, however, the issue regarding the propriety of 
the referral of this case from Judge Hyde back to Judge Rigtrup 
was not raised before the trial court, and the issue has thus been 
waived by the Plaintiff and Appellant for purposes of this appeal. 
It was held in State v. Smith, 866 P.2d 532, 533 (Utah 1993) that, 
"It is black-letter law that an appellate court will not address 
issues raised for the first time on appeal except in extraordinary 
circumstances . . " [emphasis added], citing Onq International, 
Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). Also see State 
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v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) and State v. Steqqall, 660 P.2d 
252 (Utah 1983). 
Following Judge Hyde's ruling of February 2, 1995, vacating 
the Reinstatement of Summary Judgment and referring the matter 
back to Judge Rigtrup, the Plaintiff and Appellant objected only 
to the form of the proposed Order submitted by the Defendants and 
Appellees, and signed by Judge Hyde on February 8, 1995 [R 789]. 
There was never any objection below whatsoever with respect to 
Judge Hyde's involvement in this case, or with respect to the 
propriety of Judge Hyde's decision to refer the case back to Judge 
Rigtrup, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. This issue has only been raised by the Plaintiff 
and Appellant for the first time on appeal, and thus it has not 
been preserved for said purposes. In accordance with the 
applicable case law, this argument has been waived by the 
Plaintiff and Appellant and should not be afforded any weight 
whatsoever at this stage of the proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff and Appellant has attempted, by taking 
advantage of the fact that the Defendants did not pay the 
settlement amount on the arbitrary and conditional deadline date, 
to avert the merits of this case, and to do everything possible to 
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avoid going to trial. This is due to the fact that the 
Plaintiff's substantive claims in this case have been 
nonmeritorious. Manifest injustice would result in this case if 
the Defendants are burdened with a $38,842.74 Summary Judgment, 
when that judgment was previously voluntarily vacated by a 
Stipulation between the parties. This is especially truef 
I 
inasmuch as the Plaintiff has already agreed to accept $7,500.00 
as a full settlement of all claims to resolve this dispute. 
Judge Rigtrup clearly took this position in ruling in favor of the 
Defendants, and enforcing the material terms to the September 21, 
1994 in-court stipulation. The Judge properly ruled that 
Defendants and Appellees were not bound by the arbitrary deadline 
date of October 4, 1993, due to inadvertence, and consistent with 
Utah Code Annotated §78-51-32. 
Judge Rigtrup had the full opportunity to review all of the 
background facts and judicial proceedings which comprise this 
case. The Judge properly ruled that the material terms to the 
previous settlement agreement between the parties of September 21, 
1994 should remain in force, despite the elapsing of the initial 
arbitrary deadline date for making said payment. The Judge ruled 
that there had been excusable neglect on the part of the 
Appellees, in light of the mistake of fact thereby, and the 
convoluted procedural history of this case. The trial court Judge 
24 
had broad discretion, in the interests of justice and fair play, 
to make such a determination, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and in accordance with the applicable Utah case law. 
DATED this .T^ day of August, 1995. 
By RAY ZOLIy 
Sttorneyf tod Defendants/Appellees 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this Q4^ day of 
August, 1995, to the following: 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
IAN A FORREST 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
s^hyi 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
GULL LABORATORIES, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WESTON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 930900564 
STIPULATION, 9-21-94 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st, 
1994, at 9:00 o'clock a.m., this cause came on for 
hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, 
District Court, without a jury in the Salt Lake 
County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
JOSEPH RUST 
Attorney at Law 
RAY ZOLL 
Attorney at Law 
CAT by: CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR 
ExhSli »" 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is in the matter of Gull 
3 Laboratories versus Floyd E. Weston; File 930900564. 
4 May we have your appearances for the 
5 record, please? 
6 MR. RUST: Joseph Rust on behalf of the 
7 Plaintiff. 
8 MR. ZOLL: Ray Zoll representing the 
9 Defendants, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: And it's my understanding 
11 that the Defendant will pay Plaintiff $7,500 within 
12 ten days or suffer default judgment to enter as 
13 previously entered? 
14 MR. ZOLL: That is correct, your Honor. 
15 Can we say ten days from the stipulation 
16 being signed by the Judge, the stipulation and order, 
17 which Mr. Rust would prepare the papers and we'd 
18 approve it as to form? 
19 MR. RUST: I think we have an agreement 
20 here. 
2 1 THE COURT: On or about 5:00 p.m., 
22 September -- October 1. 
23 MR. ZOLL: That's agreeable, your Honor. 
24 MR. RUST: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Is that agreeable? 
1 MR. RUST: October 1 is a Saturday, your 
2 Honor. 
3 THE COURT: 5:00 p.m. on Monday? 
4 MR. ZOLL: That will be agreeable. 
5 MR. RUST: That will be the 3rd. 
6 MR. ZOLL: That will be the 3rd. 
7 October 3rd by 5:00 o'clock — 
8 THE COURT: $7,500. 
9 MR. ZOLL: — and dismissal --
10 THE COURT: In the event there is a 
11 default, then Mr. Rust can submit an affidavit that 
12 it wasn't paid; judgment may then enter as previously 
13 entered by Judge Moffat. 
14 MR. ZOLL: Yes. And Mr. Rust prepare the 
15 dismissal papers? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 Each party to pay their own fees and 
18 costs. 
19 Okay. 
20 MR. ZOLL: Thank you, Judge. 
21 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s • 
4 County of SALT LAKE ) 
5 
6 I, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify 
7 that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary 
8 Public in and for the State of Utah; 
9 That I took down the proceedings aforesaid at 
10 the time and place therein named and thereafter 
11 reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided 
12 transcription (CAT) under my direction and control; 
13 I further certify that I have no interest in 
14 the event of this action. 
15 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 7th day of 
16 October, 1994. 
17 
18 
19 (Signature) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR. 
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GULL LABORATORIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and 
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
FLOYD WESTON 
Civil No. 930900564 CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, FLOYD WESTON, being first duly sworn under oath 
depose and say: 
•• •') • ) * > 1 v 
1. I am of adult years and competent to make this 
Affidavit for said purposes. All the statements hereinafter set 
forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my 
personal and direct, knowledge of the matters to which said 
statements pertain. If called as a witness by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, I am able to and shall testify as to each 
and all of said matters in the manner heretofore set forth in this 
Affidavit. 
2. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident 
of the State of Utah over the age of 18 years. 
3. I am an individual Defendant in the above-entitled 
matter, and I am the President of the corporate Defendants 
involved herein. 
4. The Court in this case requested that the parties 
discuss settlement. My counsel called me and described the 
settlement negotiations. Although I was involved in the 
settlement agreement of September 21, 1994, I misunderstood my 
counsel over the telephone, relative to the October 4, 1994 
deadline. 
2 
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5. I anticipated that a written order would be 
prepared, providing me with a chance to review it and make sure 
that it was acceptable, as per prior experience I have had with 
the local rules of this Court. 
6. In any event, I first was required to obtain the 
approval of the Board of Directors of the corporate Defendants, 
before this amount could be disbursed in accordance with the 
standard operating procedures thereof, and this approval had not 
yet been received at the time of the unknown deadline. 
7. I personally informed agents for the Plaintiff over 
the telephone that this was the status of the settlement 
agreement, and that I was awaiting Board approval. I further 
informed agents for the Plaintiff that the Defendants were still 
willing to pay the $7,500.00 amount, but agents for the Plaintiff 
refused to accept said amount. 
8. Therefore, in the event that this settlement 
agreement and the $7,500.00 amount is no longer acceptable to the 
Court, I have instructed my counsel to request that a trial date 
be scheduled in order that this matter may be heard, and so that I 
may have my day in court. 
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT: 
DATED this 'Q "day of getpber, 1994. 
On this /3' day of October, 1994, personally appeared before 
me FLOYD WESTON, known to me as the person named in and who 
executed this Affidavit and acknowledged that said Affidavit was 
read and was understood by said person and was executed as the 
free act and deed of said person. 
IMJLC* 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY^ PUBLIC 
Residing At:, 
vAivvcL^mvLV^ 
NOTARY PU2LIC 
STATE CF UTAH 
K'.y Comrr*ss>cn Expires 
Mf-
5:i3So«m2£0V.'sa*:6l) 
S? I L^3 C tv. U -1 8*123 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this \S day of 
October, 1994, to the following: 
Joseph C. Rust 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5 
%\ (t 
B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GULL LABORATORIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FLOYD E. WESTON dba METABOLIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE and 
FORMULA TECHNOLOGY, INC., 
a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, B. RAY ZOLL, being first duly sworn under oath depose 
and say: 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
OF B. RAI ZOLL 
Civil No. 930900564 CV 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
1 
1. I am of adult years and competent to make this 
Affidavit for said purposes. All the statements hereinafter set 
forth within this Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my 
personal and direct knowledge of the matters to which said 
statements pertain. If called as a witness by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, I am able to and shall testify as to each 
and all of said matters in the manner heretofore set forth in this 
Affidavit. 
2. I am a citizen of the United States and a resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah over the age of 18 years. 
3. I am the attorney of record for the Defendants in 
the above-entitled matter and therefore I have direct involvement 
and personal knowledge pertaining to the facts leading up to, and 
subsequent to, the Plaintiff's Motion for Reinstatement of Summary 
Judgment. 
4. Joseph C. Rust, in his Affidavit dated October 17, 
1994, stated that, during the course of a telephone conversation 
which he had with me on October 4, 1994: 
Mr. Zoll informed affiant that although defendants had not 
paid the money by October 3, 1994, that they were still 
desirous to do so but would not be able to make the payment 
2 
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of $7,500.00 until the following Monday, October 10. 
However, this is a mischaracterization of what I actually said 
during that conversation. 
5. I explained to Mr. Rust, during that October 4, 
1994 telephone conference, that Defendant Floyd Weston would need 
to receive the approval of the board of directors of the corporate 
Defendant, Formula Technlogy. I also explained at that time that 
my client, Defendant Floyd Weston, had misunderstood the outcome 
of the settlement conference, and was unaware of the October 4, 
1994 deadline for payment of the settlement amount. 
6. Furthermore, no mention was made at that time 
relative to a reinstatement of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or to any other form of default proceedings. I then 
stated that we would still pay the $7,500.00 to settle the matter 
by Monday, October 10, 1994, or go to trial. Mr. Rust refused to 
accept the arrangements, but stated that our client had to call 
his client. 
7. Mr. Rust has been apprised throughout of the 
situation and of the reasons for nonpayment of the settlement 
amount by the Defendants. 
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FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT: 
DATED this £ day of November 
On this 4~ day of November/ 1994, personally appeared 
before me B. RAY ZOLL, known to me as the person named in and who 
executed this Affidavit and acknowledged that said Affidavit was 
read and was understood by said person and was executed as the 
free_act and_deed of said person. 
> ZZ'O 3CL2h ~CQ W--t /ZCO 
" \ Ja.t Laka C.:y. *JT 64 « 23 
My Ccrrmssicn Sxprat 
Januarys, "S93 
STATS Cr UTAH 
My Commiss ion E x p i r e s ; 
*' *WfyG' z~ 
NOTARY^UBLIC 
R e s i d i n g A t : 
S.L.C 
f> A 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct/copy of the 
~> ft?f foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this JD day of 
November, 1994, to the following: 
Joseph C. Rust 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 /: 
Attorney for Plaintif-f^ \ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Civil No. 930500564CV 
HEARING ON MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
GULL LABORATORIES, INC. 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FLOYD E. WESTON dba 
METABOLIC RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE and FORMULA 
TECHNOLOGY, a Nevada 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of January, 
1995, commencing at the hour of 4:07 p.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
RONALD 0. HYDE, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court 
for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
videotape proceedings were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff 
For the Defendants 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
Attorney at Law 
Kesler & Rust 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
B. RAY ZOLL 
Attorney at Law 
Zoll & Branch 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
ALAN P SMITH. CSrl 
3*5 9BAHMA 0RIVE IM1) 2S&CO20 
SACT UkKE CITY UTAH 94107 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Where do we stand this time? 
MR. ZOLL: Good morning, your Honor. 
I'm—afternoon, I mean; it's been a long day for me. 
We stand—this is a motion for setting aside under 
Rule 60(b) the judgment that we—we initially had talked 
about we thought we would get Judge Rigtrup, your Honor, we 
know we had that issue, you didn't really say that would be 
an order. 
Judge Rigtrup was the one that was involved with 
the stipulation, there's a lot of ques—a lot of things I 
plan to raise today about that stipulation. 
THE COURT: Have you ever talked to 
Judge Rigtrup about doing this? The last time we left here, 
you were going to do that. 
MR. ZOLL: I understand, through his 
clerk, I've not talked to him, that she needs some kind of a 
motion or something and we didn't know exactly what to file, 
other than the motion that's pending. 
I believe that Judge Rigtrup would not have a 
problem, if I can get through his clerk, and figure out how 
to get something before him; because the problem is, the 
rule—what's in the file, when you go through the file, it 
looks like—we had that debate that we took out of the order 
that it would be Judge Rigtrup would get it, and that could 
be easily construed to make it look like that means you 
wanted it. 
And so we don't have a clear, definitive position 
for the clerks to look at to say how we get it in front of 
Judge Rigtrup. 
THE COURT: I think all you'd have to do 
is suggest to the clerk that the Judge suggested maybe 
Rigtrup ought to hear it and suggested you talk to him. 
Have you tried to talk to him personally? 
MR. ZOLL: I—yes. And he won't—he 
won't talk ex parte to me, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, the two of you then. 
MR. ZOLL: I'd be glad to walk over 
there right now and ask the Judge or get him on the phone, 
because both Counsel and I—this counsel, of course, we 
asked him and he said that he wouldn't—at least my office 
asked Mr. Rust, and he said no, that he wanted to have the 
matter heard before this Court, and— 
MR. RUST: I — 
THE COURT: Just a second. 
MR. RUST: Your Honor, I have never had 
that conversation with anyone from his office. 
MR. ZOLL: No. I understand that my--
my—my receptionist said, just even today, that we—that 
since we knew it was Judge Hyde that already had made this — 
what we felt this recommendation was, that—and I think it 
was Kathy that was on—involved on that, and she said both 
counsel have to stipulate and all—and it was Kathy that 
spoke with Mr. Rust today and he suggested that he would not 
stipulate. 
MR. RUST: Your Honor, may I just speak 
to that? 
THE COURT: Well, that was in response 
to a call that you made to Kathy? 
MR. ZOLL: Yes. 
THE COURT: You called? 
MR. ZOLL: That's correct. 
MR. RUST: Your Honor, may I just speak 
on this — this issue of Judges. As the Court notes, we have 
been before a number of different judges in this particular 
case, and for the reasons that we're all aware of. But I 
might note that when we went before Judge Hanson, this was 
Mr. Zoll's motion to continue the trial, and I was told that 
that was going to be heard before Judge Hanson, and we went 
there, and Judge Hanson sharply criticized us for assuming 
to be able to, even by stipulation, go see him. 
And—and very frankly, as I understand the system, 
that—that it is up to the clerk of Judge Moffat's Court how 
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THE CLERK: Well, he is there, but 
apparently, he doesn't have anybody there right now. 
THE COURT: What does that mean? 
THE CLERK: That she's gone to talk to 
him to see if (inaudible). 
(Inaudible) Judge Hyde, would you mind talking to 
Judge Rigtrup? 
THE COURT: Have you got him on the 
phone? 
THE CLERK: I do, and I don't understand 
the things here enough to — just do (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Judge Rigtrup? Fine, fine, 
Grant. 
I've got a case over here that I reinstated the 
judgment on based on a hearing that was held in your Court 
on the motion. 
A motion has been raised to set aside my 
reinstatement and part of the basis of it is what went on in 
your hearing, I just went on a cold record. 
I have suggested to Counsel that the motion to set 
it aside should probably be heard by you, if you're willing 
to hear it. Oh, this is—it's a motion now to set aside the 
reinstatement of the default based on—yeah, which I did 
based on your record, and the basis of it, basically would 
be, I suppose, what went on in your Court at the time that 
AI A N P «;M»TW r.sq 
the order was granted. 
I really didn't. That's about right. Now, he's 
made a motion to set that aside, but the basis of the motion 
now is basically on what went on in yours, not on what went 
on in mine. 
Yeah. My—my ruling was based on my 
interpretation of the record as to what you said, and it's — 
Well, all right. Let me take whatever I can. 
Yeah. You—do you actually have any recollection of it or — 
Well, where you stand is basically about the only 
way you're going to get before him is if I vacated my 
ruling, just back the whole thing off and let him hear it, 
and I don't particularly think that's warranted on the 
record. 
MR. ZOLL: Then could I just make my 
argument to your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think we'd better 
go forward with him. 
Go ahead. 
MR. ZOLL: All right. Let me first 
state, I—I appreciate here being here, represent the 
interest of Mr. Floyd Weston, who's seated here with us 
today, Judge. I 
We have—we do have complete confidence that the 
Court, when you see the facts and the whole procedure 
15 
outlined here, that your Honor will be able to see, I 
believe, a couple of nuances that — that kind of make this 
case, we think in fair play, lean in our favor. 
As your Honor is well aware, this is a Rule 60(b) 
motion. 60(b) is not one you always like to bring, because 
that means you're in trouble, and in this particular case, 
we know this makes your Honor a Court of equity. 
And if I could refresh your memory, Judge, I know 
you know it well; Rule 60(b) says that when we make the 
motion upon terms that are just, the Court may, -in the 
furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment relating to mistake, 
inadvertence, excusable neglect or Paragraph 7, any other 
reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment. 
There's no question that this Court is in—now 
sits in a court of fairness, analyzing the facts and the 
situation and the procedure that's happened, to make a 
discretionary decision. And it is discretionary. 
I cite the case of United Factors vs. T.C. 
Associates, 445 P.2d 766, that says it must be stressed that 
it's within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
whether the stipulation should be vacated. 
And that's what we really have here, Judge, is a 
stipulation, and that stipulation then embodies the areas of 
contract law; offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual 
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w a n t e d — 
MR. RUST: No , n o , a l l I — 
THE COURT: All I'm saying— 
MR. RDST: —said— 
THE COURT: All I'm saying is that his 
motion for the entry of judgment based on your failure to 
comply with your agreement — 
MR. RUST: Is denied then? 
THE COURT: No. No. I'm backing off 
the ruling I made on it, and you send that motion over to 
Judge Rigtrup, where you are from day one. 
MR. ZOLL: All right. 
MR. RUST: May I have this much then for 
our protection, your Honor? That the--that the $35,000 
letter of credit still remains to protect us against an 
eventual judgment? 
THE COURT: If it—you--yeah, I'll make 
that part of it; you agree to leave that in in case Judge 
Rigtrup rules the same way. Do you agree to that? 
You're going to have to face Judge Rigtrup— 
MR. WESTON: If that's what Judge Hyde 
wants. I'd rather just leave 7,500 in, but — 
THE COURT: No. Well, I'm not making a 
ruling on this 7,500. I'm going to let Rigtrup do it. 
MR. WESTON: Okay. If that's what you 
15_ 
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1 want, t h e n — 
2 MR. ZOLL: I think, your Honor, we'd 
3 just like to say that w e — w e submit that we'll do it the way 
4 you suggested, that it's to not—that we rescind the ruling 
5 and the motion then will be opened up t o — 
6 THE COURT: The record—far the record, 
7 I am rescinding my ruling on his motion to enter judgment 
8 and refer that motion over to Rigtrup. 
9 The bond that you've issued, that you have, will 
10 stay there in case it ends up that — i n the same direction, 
11 for the protection of that party. I think — I ' m not just 
12 going to flat out — I haven't really changed my mind on it, 
13 but I think in all fairness, it probably ought to go back to 
14 the one that did it. I 
15 MR. ZOLL: All right. That is fair. 
16 Thank you, Judge. We'll leave the bond in place, we'll, I 
17 guess Mr.--should I do the order? 
18 THE COURT: What you've got to argue to 
19 him now is basically the same motion that was brought in 
20 here, that — o n the entry of judgment. 
21 MR. RUST: Which will be my motion now? 
22 THE COURT: Which is your motion. 
23 MR. RUST: All right. 
24 THE COURT: I hope that disposes of it. 
25 Here's y o u r — 
15-
1 MR. ZOLL: Thank you, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: --to rectify it. And I'm 
3 sorry for all the confusion, but I don ft know what else to 
4 do with it. 
5 MR. ZOLL: Just f o r — f o r — f o r moving 
6
 this matter along, normally, we would have to have some kind 
7
 of a motion to s u b — a notice to submit and so forth; is it 
8 permissible to have Kathy arrange with Judge Rigtrup's clerk 
9 to get that on the calendar as soon as possible? 
10 THE COURT: Certainly permissible with me 
11 and he said, in effect when I was talking to him, if I — i n 
12 order to avoid all the procedure problems, that's about the 
13 only way that it ought to be done, and that's — I ' m kind of 
14 following— 
15 MR. ZOLL: And we'll get it — 
16 THE COURT: --frankly, kind of following 
17 his suggestion. 
18 MR. ZOLL: We'll get it calendared the 
19 standard way, I don't have my calendar with me, to know 
20 what's a good—what we can do, I mean, I have to — 
21 THE COURT: Well, don't put this off very 
22 long, 'cause— 
23 MR. ZOLL: I won't. I have a trial with 
24 Judge Bohling starting Tuesday that goes that week and then 
25 I've got another week-long trial with J u d g e — 
______„ 37 
1 THE COURT: Well, it isn't going to take 
2 you long to--to get together and get yourself a hearing date 
3 on it. 
4 MR. ZOLL: It won't. 
5 THE COURT: I don't know what his 
6 calendar is or anything, but--
7 MR. ZOLL: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 Appreciate it. 
9 THE COURT: All right. 
10 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Gull Laboratories, Inc., 
3 versus Floyd E. Weston, et al., File 930900564, 
4 Plaintiff is represented by Joseph C. 
5 Rust, Defendants are represented by B. Ray Zoll. 
6 The Court, after having heard argument, 
7 observes that Plaintiff has filed a Motion for 
8 Reinstatement of Summary Judgment. 
9 Defendants haven't filed any motion for 
10 relief from the effective stipulation under 60(d) 
11 whatever or any other particular affirmative motion. 
12 The Court probably ought not to lose 
13 sight of the fact that it's judging people, not 
14 lawyers. And I think, Mr. Zoll, the monkey is on 
15 your back for creating some of the problems. And 
16 you've persisted and urged your point so strongly 
17 that finally Judge Hyde has backed off. 
18 I will treat your responsive pleadings o 
19 objection as a motion for a Rule 60(b) relief. 
20 The Court will find excusable neglect on 
21 the part of Mr. Weston. 
22 I will grant relief from the -- there is 
23 still an outstanding order signed by Judge Hyde 
24 that's never been specifically withdrawn that he 
25 signed and entered February 8th, 1995. 
1 I will grant you conditional relief under 
2 Rule 65(b) on the condition that by 5:00 p.m. on 
3 March the -- March the 10th, 1995, you tender a cash 
4 or its equivalent -- that's either cash or money 
5 order or cashier's check or whatever — $7,500 plus 
6 ten-percent interest from October 3, 1995; plus 
7 $1,500 attorney's fees; plus any cost incurred by 
8 Plaintiffs in pursuing execution on the outstanding 
9 judgment that was entered. 
10 If those conditions are not met, the 
11 Order entered by Judge Hyde on October 8th, 1995, is 
12 to be reinstated. 
13 Are there any questions? Is there any 
14 lack of clarity in the Court's ruling. 
15 MR. RUST: For clarification, Your Honor, 
16 does the Court find any excusable neglect on the part 
17 of Mr. Zoll? 
18 THE COURT: I'm not going to make a 
19 finding on that. 
20 MR. ZOLL: For clarification, Your Honor, 
21 would the ten-percent interest include the $1,500 
22 from the --
23 THE COURT: Ten-percent interest on the 
24 $7,500 from October 3, 1995, until paid. 
25 In addition to that, as a condition of 
1 granting your relief, I am awarding $1,500 to 
2 Mr, Rust for fees. 
3 You've created a whole new volume since 
4 you started arguing about this. And any costs 
5 incurred in pursuing execution. 
6 MR. ZOLL: I understand. 
7 MR. RUST: I might note for the Court, 
8 Your Honor, that we have incurred more than $1,500 in 
9 attorney's fees --
10 THE COURT: I understand. 
11 MR. RUST: -- from that date to the 
12 present. 
13 THE COURT: If I could have gotten the 
14 two of you to me instead of Judge Hyde and got you to 
15 focus on that one narrow issue, we would have saved 
16 fees for Mr. Weston, and the corporate client would 
17 have saved fees for you, Mr. Rust. 
18 And I haven't had an affidavit or 
19 whatever, but I have reviewed Volume 2, completely 
20 and gone back to the back part of Volume 1 so I think 
21 I am generally focused on all that's gone on since. 
22 And, unfortunately, I had even written 
23 half of a 4501 Ruling responding to the notice to 
24 submit. And then I go back downstairs and get the 
25 updating paper work and find that Judge Hyde had 
1 already ruled. So I tore up my good work and threw 
2 it in the wastebasket. 
3 So I have reviewed it very carefully. 
4 MR, RUST: Thank you, 
5 MR- ZOLL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: The only real basis of my 
7 ruling is that although the Court recognizes and 
8 realizes the clients ought to be bound by the actions 
9 of their attorney, I think you've created part of the 
10 problem, Mr. Zoll. And it was clear and unmistakable 
11 in my mind. Part of the problem was that I pushed 
12 you -- the notice was clear in my mind that there was 
13 a settlement conference, but there was also a pending 
14 motion. And I said we are going to start talking. 
15 But I did it from the bench. I said: "We are going 
16 to talk about settlement," and I had you going back 
17 and forth between here and the telephone. And I will 
18 accept as true what Mr. Weston has said in his 
19 Affidavit and afford him the benefit of excusable 
20 neglect. 
21 MR. RUST: Would you like me to prepare 
22 an order, Your Honor? 
23 THE COURT: Will you prepare an order? 
24 MR. RUST: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: We will be in recess. 
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MR. RUST: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. ZOLL: Thank you. 
(Hearing adjourned.) 
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